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1. Introduction 
Governance theory view public policy making as a process that involves intensive interaction 
and collaboration between a wide range of relevant and affected stakeholders in a complex and 
dynamic plurality of more or less institutionalized arenas placed at the interface between state 
and society. The emergence of this interactive understanding of governance goes hand in hand 
with the development of an interactive perspective on democracy that highlights the democratic 
value of interactive arenas in which public authorities and affected stakeholders make joint 
decisions. These arenas bring together representative and participatory forms of democracy for 
the benefit of both. The proponents of this new approach to democracy advocate for the 
establishment of a broad variety of interactive arenas such as Deliberative Forums, User 
Boards, Governance Networks, Consensus Conferences and Citizen Juries that bring public 
authorities, affected stakeholders and the broader citizenry into dialogue with each other and 
engage them in a collaborative, problem driven effort to deal with specific wicket governance 
problems (Fishkin and Luskin, 2004; Gastil and Levine, 2005; Smith, 2005; Fung, 2006; Yang 
and Bergrud, 2008). What we witness here is a new turn in democratic thought that disregards 
what represents a cornerstone in traditional theories of liberal democracy: the existence of a 
sharp institutional separation of state and society (Macpherson 1977, 2; Held, 1989, 41; Holden, 
1993, 16; Sørensen, 2002). This spherical separation was viewed as crucial for ensuring 
political equality and liberty: political equality in relation to the state and liberty in civil society 
(Habermas, 1989; Sartori, 1989). The current call for collaboration between public authorities 
and stakeholders in interactive arenas marks a radical break with this line of thinking.  
 But to what extent is it possible to democratically regulate interactive governance 
processes that take place in these new governance arenas located at the borderline between state 
and society? Governance theorists have in general been relatively optimistic regarding the 
democratic implications of interactive forms of governance (Klijn and Skelcher, 2006), but 
concerns have been voiced concerning the extent to which it is possible to ensure democratic 
core values such as equality (Dreyer, 2007: 255; Benz and Papadopoulos, 2006: 8), deliberation 
(Bang, 2003: 241; Etzioni-Halevy, 2003) and accountability (Risse, 2006: 179; Rhodes, 1997: 
58; Pierre and Peters, 2005: 138) in this kind of governance processes. The concerns are well 
founded as interactive governance arenas do indeed dismantle traditional institutionalized ways 
of ensuring democratic equality, deliberation and accountability.  
 It is, however, neither a realistic nor a desirable reaction to these concerns to pursue a 
reinstatement of the traditional model of representative government. It is unrealistic because 
interactive forms of governance, whether we like it or not, play an important role in the 
governing of contemporary societies, and they must be expected to continue to do so for a 
foreseeable future due to their important  contribution to the governing of society. The 
widespread and effective use of interactive forms of governance is documented in several 
empirical studies (Van Heffen, Kickert, Thomassen, 2000; Stoker, 2000; Rhodes, 2000; Grote 
and Gbikpi, 2002; Bache and Flinders, 2004; Benz and Papadoupolos, 2006; Marcussen and 
Torfing, 2007; Meuleman, 2008). A reinstatement of representative democracy in its traditional 
form, however, is also undesirable. In recent years harsh criticisms have been made of the 
actual ability of the institutions of representative democracy to deliver what it promises. Have 
these institutions really been all that successful in ensuring citizens’ ability to influence 
decisions that concern them (Young, 2000; Hirst, 2000; Dryzek, 2000; Fung and Wright, 2003; 
Pitkin, 2004)? And, does the ongoing celebration of this particular model of democracy not 
shadow the fact that the strength of democracy lies in its ability to reinterpret and reorganize 
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itself in the light of the social, political, material and cultural changes that take place in the 
society it aims to regulate (Barber, 1996; Connolly, 1996; Saward, 2006)?  
 Strategic considerations regarding how to safeguard democracy should therefore seek to 
develop new understandings and forms of democracy that are compatible with contemporary 
societies. What is called for at this point in time is the development of an interactive perspective 
on democracy that establishes normative criteria and draws the contours of an institutional 
framework capable of promoting democracy in interactive governance processes as those 
described elsewhere in this book. The aim of the paper is to contribute to the development of 
this new interactive perspective on democracy. First, the article provides a review of the hopes 
and worries for democracy issued by agents of the new governance perspective. Then follow an 
attempt to develop a set of normative criteria for the evaluation of the democratic quality of 
interactive forms of governance. Finally, I consider how neo-institutionalist theory can inform 
the search for ways to institutionalize democracy in a way that live up to these criteria.   
 
 
2. Hopes and worries for democracy seen though the lenses of the 
governance perspective  
Governance theorists increasingly emphasise the need to know more about the democratic 
impact of interactive forms of governance, and the amount of publications that addresses this 
issue is growing (Pierre, 2000; Cain, Dalton and Scarrow, 2003; Bogason, Kensen and Miller, 
2004; Pierre and Peters, 2005; Klijn and Skelcher, 2006; Sørensen and Torfing, 2007). The 
literature expresses a mixture of hopes and worries concerning the future of democracy. There 
is a general hope that interactive forms of governance will add to the development of a more 
vibrant democracy by providing arenas in which those who are engaged in top-down and 
bottom-up processes of governance can meet and communicate, debate and negotiate, 
coordinate and collaborate (Jessop, 2000; Fung and Wright, 2003; Hirst, 2000; Creighton, 
2005; Gastil and Levine, 2005; Dryzek, 2007: 272). Interactive arenas are expected to be 
beneficial for democracy because they: 
 
• add to the development of capable and empowered citizens and sub-elites by 
providing arenas for situated political participation and deliberation 
• promote the capacity of decision makers to make informed decisions  through 
exchange of knowledge and view points between the involved and affected 
actors  
• enhance the legitimacy of the political system by augmenting its level of 
responsiveness 
• reduce implementation resistance by creating a feeling of ownership among 
those on which the implementation relies 
 
These high hopes, however, are mixed with worries. Will the low level of institutionalization of 
interactive forms of governance jeopardize their democratic quality? Interactive forms of 
governance tend to rely on either informal rules of the game or formal rules that are easily 
changed in the course of the governance process. Accordingly, many argue, it becomes difficult 
to democratically regulate the distribution of political power and influence within them. 
Maarten Hajer pin points this worry when he argues that contemporary societies are suffering 
from an institutional void that reduces our capacity to regulate governance processes and 
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thereby ensure a democratic distribution of political power and influence in society (Hajer, 
2003: 189). In his phrasing, politics takes over at the cost of the polity. While the traditional 
institutions of representative government provided a highly formalized and stable institutional 
framework for regulating political processes, the regulatory framework characterizing many of 
the new interactive forms of governance is an outcome of the political process. Seen from a 
democratic perspective, the obvious danger of the latter situation is that the rules of the game 
are determined not by generally accepted democratic norms but by the voices of those who are 
most powerful in a given policy process.     
 Governance theorists are particularly concerned about the extent to which a low level of 
institutionalization reduces the possibility of ensuring a high degree of democratic equality, 
deliberation and accountability in interactive governance processes. The traditional institutional 
model of representative democracy aimed to ensure these important democratic norms by 
means of formalized procedures that place democratic decision making power first in the hands 
of an electorate and then in the hands of a body of politicians. Although these procedures are 
still intact they do not manage to regulate the mounting number of decisions that are made in 
interactive governance arenas within and beyond the state. 
 Governance theorists have raised pertinent questions regarding how to ensure political 
equality in interactive governance processes. While the institutions of representative democracy 
guarantee the citizens an equal right to vote and run for office, interactive forms of governance 
provide much more complex, dynamic, and overlapping patterns of political participation and 
representation (Fung and Wright, 2003; Dreyer, 2007; Dryzek, 2007; Saward, 2006). An 
interactive approach to democracy must therefore be able to answer the question: How can 
democratic equality be ensured in a governance context consisting of a plurality of channels of 
political influence among which participation in general elections is only (an important) one 
such channel out of many?  
 Questions have also been raised concerning the conditions for democratic deliberation in 
interactive forms of governance. Governance theorists argue that these forms of governance 
tend to be hegemonized by a technocratic and pragmatic ‘getting things done’ rhetoric which 
disregards that what is at stake in these processes are political matters (Sørensen and Torfing, 
2007: 313; Bang, 2003: 13-4). This de-politicization of interactive governance processes means 
that disputes are treated as matters that can be settled with reference to scientific and technical 
knowledge and managerial performance criteria. Consequently, the space for governing society 
with reference to what we like or do not like, what we want or do not want, and what we view 
as good or bad is being overtaken by governance based on a technocratic, rationalist 
managerialism that is perceived to be in little need of democratic deliberation. In order to avoid 
a situation in which the surge of interactive forms of governance results in a reduction of the 
realm of democratic deliberation, an interactive approach to democracy must be able to answer 
the following question: How is it possible to ensure that interactive governance arenas come to 
function as platforms for democratic deliberation?      
 Finally, it has been pointed out that democratic accountability becomes illusionary if the 
decisions for which we hold politicians to account are taken in interactive arenas where the 
politicians are either not been present or are making the decisions in complex negotiation 
games with various public and/or private stakeholders (Pierre and Peters, 2005: 127; Esmark, 
2007: 224). An interactive approach to democracy must therefore be able to answer the 
following question: How can decision makers be held to account when decisions are taken in 
complex processes of interactive governance that involve elected as well as non-elected actors?  
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We can now conclude that a look through the lens of the governance perspective produces 
a mixed image of the democratic implications of interactive forms of governance. Interactive 
governance arenas can potentially contribute to the development of a more vibrant, responsive, 
legitimate and effective democracy by bringing public authorities and involved and affected 
stakeholders together in a joint effort to govern society. At the same time, however, the low 
and/or fragile level of formal institutionalization of these forms of governance limit the 
relevance and impact of the traditional institutional model of representative democracy and thus 
reduces its ability to guarantee important democratic norms. This mixed message highlights the 
need to develop a new approach to democracy that points out ways to harvest the democratic 
potentials and avoid the dangers for democracy that go hand in hand with the surge of 
interactive forms of governance.   
 
 
3. Towards an interactive perspective on democracy 
Two considerations seem of immediate relevance in developing and interactive approach to 
democracy. First, I consider how to interpret and apply the democratic norms of equality, 
deliberation and accountability to interactive forms of governance. Inspiration is to be found in 
recent attempts among democratic theorists to reformulate some of the basic concepts of 
democratic thought (Behn, 2003; Dryzek, 2007; Saward, 2006; Young, 2000; Warren, 2008). 
Second, I think about the possible implications for democratic theory of the recent neo-
institutionalist re-conceptualization of what is meant by an institution. What does this new 
conceptualization have to offer in the search for ways to democratically regulate interactive 
forms of governance characterized by a relatively low or dynamic level of formal 
institutionalization?  
 The first step consists in considering how the recent efforts to reformulate and reinterpret 
the concepts of democratic equality, deliberation and accountability inform our understanding 
of how these important democratic norms can be promoted in and through interactive forms of 
governance.    
 
3.1. Reconsidering democratic equality 
One of the most vital democratic objectives is to ensure that those who are affected by a 
decision have an equal access to influencing that decision. In representative democracies this 
ambition has been interpreted as the act of ensuring all citizens in a given nation state an equal 
right to vote and to run for office. Democratic inclusion – to count as one of those who are 
eligible to equal rights - is granted with reference to citizenship. In decentralized political 
systems the national citizenship and the patterns of democratic inclusion and exclusion they 
offer have been supplemented by what could be called a local citizenship that grants those who 
live in a specific locality an equal access to influence decisions of particular relevance to them.  
 In recent years, the traditional way of exclusively drawing democratic lines of inclusion 
and exclusion with reference to territory has become problematized (Dryzek, 2007; Sørensen 
and Torfing, 2005; Young, 2000). This problematization is not least triggered by the emergence 
of the governance perspective which illuminates that the democratic ambition of ensuring an 
equal inclusion of the affected is not necessarily most effectively achieved by exclusively 
referring to affectedness in terms of territory. Affectedness is in many cases more closely 
related to function or problem area than to territory (Rhodes, 1997; Jessop, 2000). Not all 
citizens in a given territory are equally affected by decisions concerning care for the elderly. 
 5
They may all be indirectly affected in the sense that most will get old at some point or have 
relatives who are old. Nevertheless, those who use these kinds of services at a given point in 
time are indisputably more intensely affected than those who are not. It is exactly this line of 
thinking that lies behind the surge of user-boards and other arrangements that grant users of 
particular public services an opportunity to influence the character of these services (Sørensen, 
2000).   
 By focussing on levels of affectedness as depending partly on territory and partly on 
function opens the door for the construction of more fine tuned and tailor made patterns of 
democratic inclusion than those offered by the traditional approach to ensuring equal inclusion. 
Actors are no longer either included or excluded from democratic participation and influence 
depending on whether or not they have citizen status. They might be included to a varying 
degree reflecting levels of affectedness in relation to specific policy issues and situations. In 
this complex democratic scenario all individuals have their particular tailor made inclusion 
profile.  
 But what happens to the notion of democratic equality in a governance context with 
diverse inclusion profiles? The call for equality among the affected is no longer simply a matter 
of granting equal access to influence to all within a pre-defined territory but demands for an 
active situated identification of levels of affectedness and an institutional set up that guarantees 
that those who are equally affected are equally included. Therefore, it is insufficient to pursue 
political equality by granting the citizens of a given territory an equal right to participate in 
general elections. General elections are simply too insensitive to actual levels of affectedness 
and should therefore be supplemented by other channels of political inclusion organized around 
functionally defined demarcations of affectedness.  
 A democratic perspective that aims to promote equality in a way that takes levels of 
affectedness into account must give up the idea that it is possible to find one unitary and neat 
mechanism for ensuring democratic equality. Political equality calls for the establishment of a 
complex overlapping plurality of territorially and functionally demarcated channels of influence 
that each aim to distribute political influence equally among those who are equally affected by a 
particular governance process.   
 Interactive governance arenas that bring relevant political authorities and affected 
stakeholders together in a shared effort to govern particular policy areas can be seen as a 
positive contribution to developing this kind of tailor made patterns of democratic inclusion and 
exclusion. The participants in these interactive governance arenas, however, are often elites and 
sub-elites that do not necessarily speak on behalf of the larger group of affected. In order for 
these interactive arenas to contribute to an equal inclusion of those who are particularly 
affected, the question representativeness becomes relevant: To what extent do those who 
participate in the interactive governance arenas represent a constituency of affected?  
 One of the major problems in this respect is that the participants are rarely elected. Recent 
theories on democratic representation suggest, however, that representativeness does not 
necessarily depend on whether or not decision makers are elected. Michael Saward argues that 
democratic representation is basically about making claims to represent, and that the strength of 
this kind of claims depends on the degree to which the claims are accepted by the stipulated 
constituency. In other words, representation is taking place when a group of people accept to be 
constructed as the constituency of a given decision maker (Saward, 2006: 210). According to 
this line of thinking, democratic representation does not depend on the degree to which a 
decision-maker seeks to promote pre-given interests or view points of a defined constituency. 
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The act of representation is basically a productive endeavour in which elites and sub-elites are 
capable of constructing a constituency with specific interests and view points. As such, 
representation is basically a rhetorical task in which collective political identities come into 
being.  
 This new approach to representation is helpful in relation to considering how to promote 
the representativeness of interactive forms of governance, but it overlooks two things. First, it 
does not take into account that one of the purposes of this kind of claim making is to gain 
legitimacy in the eyes of other elites and sub-elites. Representation is not only a vertical 
relationship between elites and constituencies. It is also a matter of being accepted as a 
legitimate player in political power games between decision makers. While this legitimacy is 
traditionally gained by being elected, it is a much more difficult endeavour to be accepted as a 
legitimate representative if you are not. The status as a representative must be actively earned. 
You must be able convince other elites and sub-elites that you speak on behalf of a given 
constituency and can vouch for their support/non-resistance. In other words, making claims to 
represent is both a vertical and horizontal matter. Second, the new approach to representation 
tends to overlooks the fact that not only individual representatives that participate in interactive 
governance arenas must legitimize their participation by making claims to represent affected 
constituencies in a particular governance arena. The governance arena as a whole must also 
seek to obtain democratic legitimacy by convincing the larger society that it represents not only 
some but all the affected stakeholders.  
To sum up the argument, the representativeness of those participating in interactive 
governance processes depends on three things: 1) The ability of the individual participants to 
construct a particular constituency that accepts to be represented, 2) their ability to get the other 
participants to accept their position as representatives, and 3) to get the wider citizenry and 
other decision making bodies to recognize the interactive governance arena as a democratically 
legitimate actor.  
 But how is it possible to ensure that participants in interactive governance arenas as well 
as the arenas themselves need to make claims to represent and get acceptance of these claims? 
As not all interactive governance arenas are in immediate need of democratic legitimacy and 
public support they might not need to make claims to represent and get these claims accepted. 
In fact they might enjoy and prosper from their hidden position. This is particular the case with 
governance arenas that govern tasks that do not rely on public resources. Accordingly, the 
promotion of political equality through the establishment of a plurality of supplementary and 
overlapping arenas in which public authorities and private actors co-govern calls for the 
construction of an institutional set up that makes it necessary for the participants to make 
claims to represent that legitimize the role that they themselves, as well as the governance 
arena as such, play in the governance process.  
 
3.2 Reconsidering democratic deliberation 
A second cornerstone in democratic thought is that political decisions must be made on the 
grounds of democratic deliberation e.g. verbal interaction between citizens in a free public 
sphere. Although traditional theories of democracy have different reasons for praising 
democratic deliberation, they all tend to establish a close link between democratic deliberation 
and the capacity for rational reasoning. Aggregative theories  of democracy claim that 
democratic deliberation enhances the citizens’ ability to identify and pursue their individual 
views and interests by making sound and well-informed choices between political elites at 
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Election Day (Mill, 1820; Dahl, 1987), while integrative theories of democracy view 
deliberation as a means to enhance the citizens’ capacity to take part in processes of consensus 
based decision making aiming to promote the common good (Stuart Mill, 1861; Barber, 1984).  
 In the 1980s and 1990s, the perception of democratic deliberation as a process that 
enhances the citizens’ capacity for rational reasoning was brought to the very centre of 
democratic thought by the surge of the deliberative theories of democracy. From being seen as 
an important precondition for democratic decision-making, democratic deliberation and the 
capacity for rational reasoning that it was supposed to produce was increasingly perceived as 
the very essence of democratic decision-making. Accordingly, the core objective of deliberative 
theories became that of identifying institutional conditions in which deliberation in terms of 
rational reasoning is not distorted by other rationales such as the instrumental, systemic 
rationales of state and market (Habermas, 19966; Cohen, 1989).  
 Theorists of deliberative democracy have devoted special efforts to designing interactive 
institutional arenas that bring relevant experts and citizens together in a joined effort to 
formulate public policies through knowledge based rational reasoning. Citizen Panels, Citizen 
Hearings and Consensus Conferences are just three out of a plurality of institutional designs 
that aim to qualify democratic deliberation (Fishkin, 1995; Fixdal, 1997; Smith, 2003).  
 These new interactive arenas fit well into the governance perspective, but the perception 
of them as platforms for reasoned deliberation between experts and citizens has contributed to 
constructing an image of these governance arenas as relatively a-political processes that aim to 
identify the ‘good’ or the ‘right’ solution on the basis of rational reasoning and exchange of 
information and viewpoints between actors with relevant knowledge and insights. As we shall 
see, this de-politicization of interactive governance processes, which was already inflicted by 
the dominance of managerial and expertise oriented approaches to governance, is highly 
problematic because it overlooks the political aspects of democratic deliberation.    
  Recent strands of democratic theory have raised criticisms of deliberative theories of 
democracy on exactly this point (Mouffe, 2005; Norval, 2007). Democratic deliberation, it is 
argued, should not be viewed as a means either to qualify the citizens’ ability to make reasoned 
rational choices in the pursuit of individual views and interests, or to define the common good 
though reasoned consensus making. Democratic deliberation should rather be perceived as a 
political battleground in which different political forces struggle to convince others of their 
particular versions of what is to be perceived as reasonable and rational. In other words, what is 
seen as rational and reasonable should be viewed as contingent outcomes of political battles 
rather than as pre-given facts.  
 Seen in this light, the price that is paid when deliberative theory conceptually as well as 
normatively links democratic deliberation to rational reasoning is the exclusion of constitutive 
forces of politics such as emotion and passion (Young, 2000). If the understanding of 
democratic deliberation is more directly linked to the notion of the political becomes apparent 
that democratic deliberation should be seen as a battleground in which particularistic political 
projects that have no higher justification that the fact that there are people who pursue them, 
aspire to obtain a universal, hegemonic position as the common good. Furthermore, it becomes 
clear that the democratic qualifications needed to take part in this kind of deliberative battle is 
not so much the ability to reason, but the possession of the rhetorical skills that make it possible 
for the actors to sell their political projects as logical outcomes of rational reasoning (Norval, 
2007: 87). What makes political deliberation democratic is not the participants’ capacity for 
rational reasoning but their willingness to abide to a specific agonist democratic ethos that calls 
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upon them to respect the opponents’ right to disagree, and to find ways to cope with this 
disagreement in the pursuit of collective decision-making (Connolly, 1991; Mouffe, 2005). In 
this way, democratic deliberation is basically understood as a process of political contestation 
in which the participants recognize that their own as well as the other participants’ positions 
have no higher justification than its ability to gain support, and that this support is and should 
be a product of their respective abilities to convince each other.   
 The conceptual and normative de-coupling of democratic deliberation and rational 
reasoning is noteworthy as it paves the way for a re-politicization of democratic deliberation in 
general and of interactive forms of governance in particular. I do, however, disagree with the 
presumption that the burden of ensuring the democratic quality of political deliberation can be 
left entirely on the shoulders of an agonist ethos. This kind of ethos must be supported by an 
institutional set up that supports the development and sedimentation of agonist sentiments 
among the involved parties. As pointed out by Mark Warren (2008), democratic deliberation in 
which conflicts are dealt with though talk aiming to persuade, calls for institutional designs that 
nurture this kind of talk-based, negotiated interaction. If such institutional conditions are in 
place, deliberation can become an important factor in the pursuit of collective action and 
governance.    
 Interactive forms of governance invite this kind of deliberation because they provide 
arenas for negotiated decision making that bring together a broad variety of public authorities 
and affected actors with different interests, views and backgrounds. The interactive character of 
these arenas promotes political contestation because there are no other ways of producing a 
shared outcome than through negotiated agreements. The medium is deliberation. The 
outspoken fragility of such arenas calls for the institutionalization of stabilizing conditions that 
nurtures the willingness of the involved actors to deliberate that is to take the trouble to 
persuade others and to allow oneself to be persuaded.        
 
3.3. Reconsidering democratic accountability  
Ensuring democratic accountability is vital for all forms of democracy where some make 
decisions on behalf of others. Democratic accountability means that it is possible for those who 
are affected by a decision to hold the decision makers responsible (March and Olsen, 1995; 
141; Bovens, 2006: 9), and keeping decision makers responsible calls for two resources: 
information about who made what decisions and means to sanction decision makers who 
misbehave.  
 One of the strongholds of the model of representative government is said to be its ability 
to provide a high level of democratic accountability partly by means a free and independent 
press that keeps the citizens informed about the acts of the government, and partly by means of 
universal franchise that provides the citizens with an opportunity to sanction that government. 
As illuminated by innumerable studies of the actual functioning of representative democracy, 
there is a considerable degree of ‘make believe’ in the high level of accountability that is said to 
come out of this polyarcic arrangement (Schumpeter, 1946; March and Simon, 1958; Pressman 
and Wildavsky, 1973; Lindblom, 1959). The voters’ actual knowledge about the nature of the 
decisions made by the government tends to be limited, the causal link between decisions and 
outcomes is often unclear or hypothetical, and the ability to punish specific politicians for 
particular actions is limited due to the long intervals between elections. In other words, the 
actual effectiveness of the traditional model representative democracy when it comes to 
keeping decision makers to account tends to be lower than assumed. The cause is among other 
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things to be found in the fact that very few accountability mechanisms have to carry a very 
huge load. The information load that a free press must process and the public must consume is 
enormous, and the opportunities to sanction decision makers are few and far between. Effective 
democratic accountability calls for supplementary channels of accountability  
 As pointed out by several theorists, interactive governance arenas can potentially improve 
the accountability of governance processes by augmenting the information level and qualify the 
sanctioning of decision makers (Weber, 1999; Behn, 2005; Fung, 2006; Bovens, 2008). When 
relevant and affected public and private actors are brought together and negotiate in interactive 
arenas, those who are affected by the decisions get the opportunity to ask questions and raise 
critiques while the decision makers can produce narrative accounts or stories that aim to justify 
these decisions (Marsh and Olsen, 1995: 149). The outcome is a more knowledgeable and 
targeted level of accountability.    
 What complicates matters, however, is that interactive governance arrangements that 
bring together public authorities and affected stakeholders in a shared effort to improve the 
level of accountability of public authorities, themselves become arenas for decision making in 
need of democratic accountability (Esmark: 2007: 282; Bovens, 2006: 6). If interactive arenas 
are to become a positive contribution to ensuring democratic accountability, it is important that 
there is a high degree of public awareness and knowledge about their role in the governance 
process, and a constant pressure on the arenas to produce narrative accounts that justify their 
actions in the eyes of relevant politicians and mini-publics.    
  If interactive governance arenas are made subject to this kind of soft accountability they 
hold the potential to increase the general level of democratic accountability in society. First, 
interactive arenas can make the accountability of representative democracy more effective by 
increasing the level of interaction between public authorities and affected citizens (Bovens, 
2008: 232). Second, interactive arenas can be seen as an opportunity to establish a variety of 
supplementary accountability mechanisms that are more flexible, frequent, targeted and situated 
than those provided by representative democracy. These potential accountability benefits are 
similar to those pursued through well known reform strategies such as delegation, 
decentralization and devolution (Fung, 2004).  
 The presence of interactive governance arenas, however, does not automatically guarantee 
a high level of accountability. The level of accountability depends on the extent to which the 
institutional framing of interactive governance arenas put pressure on the participants to give 
narrative accounts about their activities to relevant politicians and publics.  
 
The above considerations about what democratic equality, deliberation and accountability 
means and entails conclude that the democratic quality of interactive governance arenas rely on 
the presence of institutional conditions that promote: 1) democracy on the input side by 
ensuring that inclusion in interactive governance processes depend on whether the participating 
actors legitimize their individual participation as well as the role of the interactive governance 
arena by making claims to represent the affected; 2) the democratic throughput by enhancing 
the willingness of the participants in interactive governance arenas to persuade and be 
persuaded in deliberative contestations; and 3) democracy on the output side by putting 
pressure on those who are involved in interactive decision making to justify their actions in the 
eyes of relevant politicians and publics through the formulation of narrative accounts.  
 But how is it possible to establish the required institutional conditions if a constitutive 
feature of interactive governance processes is said to be an institutional void? Neo-institutional 
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theory, however, highlights that what might appear to be an institutional void is not necessarily 
so. As we shall see, a low level of formal institutionalization does not automatically mean that 
the general level of institutionalization is likewise. 
 
 
4. Institutionalizing interactive democracy  
The inclination of the new governance paradigm to view governance in terms of process should 
not lead the focus of attention away from the fact that interactive governance arenas are indeed 
structured by numerous institutional features. These institutional features are constantly shaped 
and reshaped in the course of the governance process, and should not only be viewed as a 
conditioning factor but also as an emerging phenomenon. Governance processes are processes 
of institutionalization. Following this line of thinking, the democratic quality of interactive 
governance processes is to be evaluated not only in the light of their present democratic 
performance but also with reference to their impact on the shaping of the initial conditioning of 
future governance processes.  
 The focus on governance as an institutionalization process rather than as a process that is 
delimited by fixed and clear cut institutional features go well in hand with a shift from an old-
institutionalist to a neo-institutionalist perspective on what institutions are and how they 
structure social action. By stressing the multi-layered, complex, ambiguous and heterogeneous 
character of institutions, neo-institutionalists point out how concrete governance processes are 
conditioned by strategic efforts to cope with this messy mix of institutional features, and how 
these strategies become the driving force in an ongoing institutionalization process (Hall, 1889; 
Moe, 1990; March and Olsen, 1989; Peters, 2005).  
 The multi-layered, ambiguous and heterogeneous character of institutions is, among other 
things, caused by the fact that formal institutional features merely represent the tip of the 
iceberg in the institutional regulation of human action. Just under the waterline we find a 
variety of more informal institutional features such as incentives, normative codes and logics, 
routines and rituals that each in their own way structures and stabilizes the interplay between 
actors. Formalized rules of conduct do indeed play a role in framing governance processes but 
their impact depends of the degree to which they are supported by incentive structures, 
normative codes and logics of appropriateness, routines and rituals that condition day to day 
action. As such, an effort to identify the level of institutionalization of governance processes 
calls for an analysis of the formal as well as all these more subtle institutional mechanisms in 
order to uncover how they add to the establishment of stable or recurrent patterns of interaction. 
Three strands of neo-institutionalist theory emphasize the regulatory powers of one of these 
institutional mechanisms. 
 Rational choice (RC) inspired branches of neo-institutionalism (Scharpf, 1994; Ostrom, 
1990) point out how actors rather than following formal rules tend to act in accordance with 
their particular interest. What this particular interest is depends very much on the incentive 
structure within which actions take place. As such, RC theory views an institution as an 
incentive structure that divides resources and capacities between a set of self-interested actors 
in a way that motivates them to act in certain ways, and institutionalization processes. 
Historical neo-institutionalism stresses how actors involved in collective decision making cope 
with emerging conflicts through the construction of normative codes that legitimize certain 
rules and procedures (hall, 1989). Such normative codes represent a strong stabilizing factor 
when formal rules change. Finally, sociological neo-institutionalists argue that institutions are 
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formed around particular institutionalized logics of appropriateness that serve as a point of 
reference when actors consider how to behave in particular situations (March and Olsen, 1989; 
Powell and Dimaggio, 1991). Over time such logics of appropriateness result in the 
sedimentation of particular forms of knowledge, role perceptions, routinized patterns of action 
and rituals that reconfirm and stabilize a particular pattern of interaction between a set of actors 
to the extent that these practices begin to live their own life.  
 The multi-layered, complex, ambiguous and heterogeneous character of the institutional 
structures that condition governance processes is partly a result of inconsistencies in formal 
rules, overlapping incentive structures, situated interpretations and reinterpretations of 
normative codes, mixes of old and new logics of appropriateness, and re-contextualization of 
routines and rituals and partly a result of the fact that formal rules, incentive structures, 
normative codes, logics of appropriateness and routinized and ritualized practices are not 
necessarily compatible.  Consequently, the idea that if we have a high level of 
institutionalization we have order is flawed. Efforts to create some level of order depend on the 
degree to which formal and informal institutional features promote the same patterns of 
behaviour.     Neo-institutionalists have done a remarkable job in enhancing our knowledge 
about the impact of informal institutional features on social interaction, and governance 
theorists have used this knowledge to answer questions concerning how societies are governed 
and how the capacity to regulate interactive governance processes can be enhanced (Sørensen 
and Torfing, 2007; Peters, 2007). With few exceptions (March and Olsen, 1995; Pierre, Peters 
and Stoker, 2009) little attention has been directed towards the potential role of incentive 
structures, normative codes, logics of appropriateness and routines and rituals might play in 
institutionalizing a strong democracy. Traditional theories of representative democracy put their 
faith in formal institutional features while they tended to overlook the potential benefit of other 
institutional features.  
 An elaborate theory of interactive democracy must consider the possible contributions of 
the full scale of institutional features in the search for ways to enhance the democratic equality, 
deliberation and accountability of interactive governance arenas. It should be noted, however, 
that an interactive approach to democracy should not exclusively celebrate institutional features 
that stabilise specific patterns of action as much as possible. Rather, this new approach to 
democracy should seek to institutionalize governance processes in a way that at one and the 
same time sediment particular patterns of action and provide space for an ongoing dynamic 
restructuring of democracy. Just as governance processes should be viewed as 
institutionalization processes, they should be viewed as ongoing democratization processes 
(Bovens, 2005; Dryzek, 2007).  
 The simultaneous need for institutional stability and change in interactive democracy 
highlights the potential value of mixing institutional mechanisms that are easily altered with 
some that are not. While formal institutional features and incentive structures can be changes 
overnight it takes a long time to change normative codes, logics of appropriateness, routines 
and rituals. On the positive side counts that changes in incentive structures and formal 
institutional setup do not necessarily place interactive governance arenas characterized by a low 
level of formal institutionalization in an institutional void. More persistent institutional features 
prevail. On the negative side counts that sedimented normative codes, logics of appropriateness 
and routines and rituals might hamper the development of new democratic understandings and 
practises. The aim of an interactive approach to democracy must be to propose a set of 
normative codes, logics of appropriateness and routinized practises and rituals that form the 
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spinal core of interactive democracy and point out how formal rules and incentives can be used 
strategically to ensure an ongoing adjustment of these stabilizing institutional features to an 
ever changing reality.  
 This kind of strategic mix of different sources of institutionalization highlighted by neo-
institutionalism has the potential to promote democratic equality in interactive governance 
processes if they encourage those who participate in these processes to make claims to 
represent. This encouragement can take the form of normative codes that call upon those who 
participate to legitimize their individual and collective inclusion in the governance process by 
making claims to represent the affected. The resources and competences that are granted to 
different interactive governance arenas can be made directly dependent on whether such claims 
are made and accepted. Moreover, normative pressures to legitimize participation can be 
supported by the institutionalization of a particular democratic logic of appropriateness for 
interactive governance arenas that construct the individual participants as well as the 
governance arena as political actors in need of input legitimacy, and by a set of routines and 
rituals that stabilize recurring patterns of action and events that spell out precisely how, where 
and when such claims are to be made.  
 A series of studies explore how a plurality of institutional factors affects the patterns of 
inclusion and representativeness in interactive governance processes. A recent study of two 
governance networks in a Danish municipality show how the informal institutional conditions 
influence the extent to which the participants seek to justify their participation my making 
claims to represent affected stakeholders. Both networks were characterized by a low level of 
formal institutionalization, but differences in incentive structure, normative codes, logics of 
appropriateness and routines and rituals meant that the participants in one network put 
considerable energy into making claims to represent and gain recognition as the voice of the 
affected while the other network did not (Sørensen, 2007). Moreover, the study shows that the 
governance network that chose to pursue its goal by becoming a legitimate player on the 
political scene through this kind of claims making was more successful in obtaining its 
objective than the network which chose a more private strategy. Another study of interactive 
governance in relation to a Dutch energy reform points out how formal and informal 
institutional meanings of representation become decoupled and how this decoupling becomes a 
barrier for the democratic quality of the interactive governance process (Hendriks, 
forthcoming).  
 Informal institutional features can also help to ensure that interactive governance arenas 
come to function as platforms for democratic deliberation? Incentive structures that construct 
interdependencies among the participating actors enhance their willingness to take the trouble 
to persuade and be persuaded, and normative codes that legitimize and valorise political 
contestation and offer procedures through which such talk-based contestations can take place 
can spur this kind of deliberation. Deliberation can also be encouraged by logics of 
appropriateness that construct the governance arena as a political arena that does not give 
priority to technocratic forms of knowledge and rational reasoning at the cost of practical and 
situated knowledge and political positions motivated by emotion and passion. Routines and 
rituals that guide concrete deliberation processes in accordance with this logic of 
appropriateness is of central importance for the degree to which such logics of appropriateness 
gain impact and stabilise concrete deliberation processes.  
 A study of collaborative processes in Dutch water management illustrates how an 
institutional construction of interactive deliberative arenas in which contestation can take place 
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promote the ability to reach negotiated agreements among a broad variety of public authorities 
and stakeholders (Buuren, Edelbos and Klijn, 2007). Another Dutch study of two local planning 
processes points out how the vitality of interactive deliberation processes depends on the 
interplay between the organisational structures and prevailing cultural logics and situated 
practises. The study concludes that the vitality of interactive deliberation processes depends on 
the ability to balance these different institutional factors against each other (Tops and Hendrik 
2007). Finally, a study of deliberation in a Canadian Citizen Assembly illuminates how role 
perceptions are formed in and through the policy process and how these role perceptions 
condition the deliberation process (Pearse, 2008).  
 With regard to the level of democratic accountability, this is highly dependent on the 
degree to which the informal institutional set up encourages decision makers to justify their 
actions in the eyes of democratic constituencies such as elected politicians and affected groups 
of stakeholders though the production of narrative accounts. The incentive to give such 
accounts can take the form of mechanisms that establish a correlation between the capacity to 
give such accounts and the chances of gaining access to future governance processes. The 
impact of this kind of incentives can be enhanced by normative codes that valorise account 
giving, logic of appropriateness that emphasize the importance of giving narrative accounts to 
politicians and relevant publics, and routines and rituals that outline precisely how, where and 
when these accounts should be given.  
 Several studies have analysed how this understanding of accountability as an interactive 
process in which decision makers give narrative accounts in an ongoing dialogue with a critical 
audience is gaining ground and manifests itself in a plurality of events and procedures that aim 
to evaluate the performance of various governance interactive arenas. Among such 
arrangements count naming-and-shaming events, self-evaluation schemes, and bench marking 
procedures. Mark Bovens and his fellow researchers have analysed how such interactive 
accountability procedures function in ensuring accountability between executive public 
authorities and decentred service providers (Bovens, Schillemans and Hart, 2008: 232). They 
underline how this narrative account giving promotes learning between the involved parties. 
They stress, however, that this new learning approach to accountability has predominantly been 
taken into use in efforts to enhance the administrative accountability of interactive governance 
processes. A recent study by Archon Fung (2004) shows that these new ways of ensuring 
narrative accountability can also be taken into use in the pursuit of democratic accountability. 
This is envisaged in his study of the primary school system in Chicago (Fung, 2004: 7), and is 
also illuminated in an analysis of the use of the OMC in EUs employment policy reveal how 
narrative account giving plays a central role in ensuring a reasonable level of democratic 
accountability in interactive multi-level governance processes in Europe (Melchior and 
Sørensen, 2009).  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Interactive forms of governance call for the development of an interactive perspective on 
democracy that proposes normative criteria for measuring the democratic quality of interactive 
governance arenas and propose how these norms can be promoted in governance arenas 
characterized by a low or unstable level of formal institutionalization. Governance theorists 
have not least been concerned about the possibility of ensuring a high level of democratic 
equality, deliberation and accountability in interactive governance processes. Inspired by the 
 14
current theoretical debate on democracy, I have argued that the democratic quality on 
interactive governance processes must be measured in terms of the degree to which the 
participating actors 1) legitimize their individual and collective participation by making claims 
to represent the affected, 2) are willing to persuade and be persuaded in and through 
deliberative contestations, and 3) are forced to justify their actions in the eyes of relevant 
politicians and publics through the formulation of narrative accounts.  
 Moreover, I have pointed out how neo-institutionalist theory can inform the search for 
ways to ensure that interactive governance processes score high on these normative criteria. 
Interactive governance arenas might be difficult to formally institutionalize but that does not 
necessarily mean that they cannot be institutionalized. Informal institutional features such as 
incentives, normative codes, logics of appropriateness, routines and rituals can play a crucial 
role in establishing the right balance between sedimentation and stability on the one hand and 
transformability and change on the other in our ongoing efforts to develop a both strong and 
dynamic democracy. A series of case studies from all over the world inform out knowledge 
about how a mix of formal and informal institutional features can contribute to pursue a strong 
interactive democracy.  
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